"Marbury v. Madison" Versión en castellano e inglés (1803)

MARBURY v. MADISON

5 US 137 (Cranch)
WILLIAM MARBURY
v
JAMES MADISON, Secretary of State of the United States.
U.S. Supreme Court
[24 de Febrero de 1803]

Relación de la causa por el relator

«En el último período, esto es, diciembre de 1801, William Madbury, Dennis Ramsay, Robert Townsend Hooe, y William Harper, a través de su abogado Charles Lee -ex ministro de Justicia de los EE.UU.- solicitaron al Tribunal que ordenara a James Madison manifestar las causas por las cuales la Corte debía abstenerse de exigirle la entrega de los nombramientos a los demandantes donde se los designaba jueces de paz del Distrito de Columbia. Esta petición fue apoyada en testimonios (incluyendo uno del hermano de John Marshall -James) de los siguientes hechos: que el señor Marshall estaba enterado de esta petición y que el señor Adams, ex presidente de los EEUU, elevó al Senado las nominaciones de los candidatos para ser designados en tales cargos; que el Senado aconsejó y consintió estas designaciones; que las correspondientes designaciones formales nombrándolos jueces fueron firmadas por el presidente y, finalmente, que el sello de los EEUU estaba puesto en debida forma en tales designaciones por el entonces secretario de Estado (John Marshall); que los solicitantes habían pedido al señor Madison que les entregara tales nombramientos con resultado negativo y que dichas designaciones les fueran retenidas.

Sobre estas bases, fue emitida una orden para que el secretario de Estado diera cuenta de las causas que motivaron su conducta».

Posteriormente, la Corte emitió la siguiente opinión conducida por el voto del presidente John Marshall:

‘‘Durante el último período la Corte expidió una orden para que el secretario de Estado exhibiera los motivos por los cuales se le denegaba a William Madbury la entrega de su designación como juez de paz del Condado de Washington, Distrito de Columbia. No se han dado razones de tal proceder y, ahora, la petición se dirige a obtener de la Corte un mandamiento que haga efectiva la entrega de dichos nombramientos.

Lo particularmente delicado de este caso, la novedad de algunas de sus circunstancias, y la verdadera dificultad que encierran los puntos contenidos en el mismo, requieren una exposición completa de los fundamentos que sostienen la opinión que dará esta Corte.

Según el orden seguido en el análisis del caso, la Corte ha considerado y decidido las siguientes cuestiones:

1) ¿Tiene el solicitante derecho al nombramiento que demanda?.

2) Si lo tiene, y ese derecho ha sido violado, ¿proveen las leyes del país un remedio a esa violación?.

3) Si lo proveen, ¿es dicho remedio un mandamiento que corresponda a esta Corte emitir?.

La primera cuestión es: ¿Tiene el solicitante derecho al nombramiento que demanda?.

Es decididamente la opinión de esta Corte que, cuando un nombramiento ha sido firmado por el presidente la designación debe considerarse hecha; y que la misma es completa cuando tiene el sello de los EEUU puesto por el secretario de Estado.

Por lo tanto, teniendo en cuenta que su nombramiento fue firmado por el presidente y sellado por el secretario de Estado, el Sr. William Madbury está designado; y como la ley que crea el cargo dio al funcionario (Madbury) el derecho de ejercerlo por 5 años en forma independiente del Ejecutivo, el nombramiento es irrevocable por conferir al funcionario designado derechos legítimos que están protegidos por las leyes de su país. La retención de su nombramiento, es por lo tanto, un acto que la Corte considera no respaldado por la ley y por ellos violatorio de legítimos derechos adquiridos.

Esto nos conduce a la segunda cuestión: Si el derecho existe y ha sido violado, ¿proveen las leyes del país un remedio a esa violación?. La esencia misma de la libertad civil consiste, ciertamente, en el derecho de todo individuo a reclamar la protección de las leyes cuando han sido objeto de un daño.

Uno de los principales deberes de un gobierno es proveer esta protección.

El gobierno de los EEUU ha sido enfáticamente llamado un gobierno de leyes y no de hombres. Tal gobierno, ciertamente, dejaría de merecer ese alto calificativo si las leyes no brindaran modos de reparar la violación de un derecho legítimamente adquirido.

Si tal cosa fuera a suceder en la jurisprudencia de nuestro país, ello sólo podría deberse a las especiales características del caso.

Nos corresponde por lo tanto, preguntarnos si existe en este caso algún ingrediente que lo exima de investigaciones o que prive a la parte perjudicada de reparación legal. ¿Está dicho elemento presente en el caso? ¿Constituye -el acto de entregar o retener una designación escrita- un mero acto político reservado al Departamento Ejecutivo para cuyo cumplimiento nuestra Constitución ha depositado la total confianza en el Ejecutivo supremo, de modo que cualquier conducta desajustada a su respecto no tenga prevista la consecuente reparación para el caso que dañe a un individuo?.

Sin duda, tales casos pueden existir. Pero que cada deber asignado a algunos de los grandes departamentos del Poder Ejecutivo constituya uno de estos casos es, sin duda, inadmisible.

De ello se sigue, por lo tanto, que el examen de la legalidad de los actos de los titulares de las reparaciones dependientes del Ejecutivo, depende -en cada caso- de la naturaleza del acto.

Por la Constitución de los EEUU, el presidente está investido de algunos importantes poderes políticos cuyo ejercicio está librado a su exclusivo arbitrio, y por el cual es sólo responsable ante el pueblo, desde el punto de vista político, y ante su propia conciencia.

Para colaborar con él en el cumplimiento de sus funciones, puede designar funcionarios que actúen bajo su autoridad y de conformidad con sus órdenes.

En estos casos, los actos de los funcionarios son los actos del presidente, y sea cual fuere la opinión que pueda merecer el modo en que el Ejecutivo utiliza sus poderes discrecionales, no existe ni puede existir poder alguno que los controle. Las materias son políticas, atañen a la Nación, no a derechos individuales, y habiendo sido confiadas al Ejecutivo, la decisión del Ejecutivo es terminante.

Lo dicho está claramente ejemplificado en la creación legislativa del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. El ministro de Relaciones Exteriores debe desempeñarse, desde que su función es creación legislativa, precisamente de conformidad con la voluntad del presidente. Es meramente el órgano a través del cual se transmite la voluntad del presidente.

Los actos de ese funcionario, en su calidad de tal, no pueden ser nunca examinados por los tribunales.

Pero cuando el Congreso impone a ese funcionario otras obligaciones; cuando se le encomienda por ley llevar a cabo ciertos actos; cuando los derechos de los individuos dependen del cumplimiento de tales actos, ese funcionario deja de ser funcionario del presidente para convertirse en funcionario de la ley; es responsable ante las leyes por su conducta y no puede desconocer a su discreción los derechos adquiridos de otros.

La conclusión de este razonamiento es que cuando los titulares de los departamentos actúan como agentes políticos o confidenciales del Ejecutivo y no hacen más que poner en práctica la voluntad del presidente -en aquellos casos en que éste posee poderes discrecionales legal o constitucionalmente conferidos-, nada puede resultar más claro que el control de tales actos sólo puede ser político. Pero cuando se les asigna por ley una obligación determinada de cuyo cumplimiento depende la vigencia de derechos individuales, parece igualmente claro que todo aquel que se considere perjudicado por el incumplimiento de tal clase de obligaciones tiene derecho a recurrir a las leyes de su país para obtener una reparación. Es por lo tanto la opinión de esta Corte que Madbury tiene derecho a su nombramiento y que la negativa a entregárselo constituye una clara violación de ese derecho frente a la cual las leyes de su país brindan un remedio.

Resta considerar ¿le corresponde el remedio que solicita? Ello depende de: a) la naturaleza de la medida que solicita, y b) el poder de esta Corte.

Si la medida solicitada fuera concedida, debería dirigirse a un funcionario del gobierno, y el contenido de la misma consistiría, usando las palabras de Blackstone, en ‘una orden de hacer algo en particular allí especificado, que atañe a su cargo y deberes y que la Corte a determinado previamente, o al menos, supuesto, que es correcto y ajustado a derecho’. O bien, en las palabras de Lord Mansfield, el solicitante, en este caso, tiene ‘un derecho a ejecutar un cargo de interés público, y es privado de la posesión de ese derecho’. Estas circunstancias ciertamente se dan en este caso.

Pero para que el mandamiento -la medida solicitada- surta los efectos deseados, debe ser enviada a un funcionario al cual pueda serle dirigida, sobre la base de los principios legales; y la persona solicitante de la medida debe carecer de otro recurso legal específico.

Respecto del funcionario al cual se dirigía la medida, la íntima relación política que existe entre el presidente de los EEUU y los titulares de los ministerios hace particularmente fastidiosa y delicada cualquier investigación legal de sus actos, y hasta puede dudarse de que corresponda llevar a cabo tales investigaciones. /es común que la gente en general no reflexione ni examine a fondo las impresiones que recibe y, desde tal punto de vista, no sería conveniente que en un caso como éste se interprete la atención judicial del reclamo de un particular como una forma de intromisión en la esfera de prerrogativas exclusivas del Poder Ejecutivo.

No es necesario que la Corte renuncie a toda su jurisdicción sobre tales asuntos. Nadie sostendría tan absurda y excesiva extravagancia ni por un momento. La competencia de la Corte consiste, únicamente, en decidir acerca de los derechos de los individuos y no en controlar el cumplimiento de los poderes discrecionales del presidente o sus ministros. Los asuntos, que por su naturaleza política o por disposición constitucional o legal, está reservados a la decisión del Ejecutivo no pueden ser sometidos a la opinión de la Corte.

Pero si no se tratara de un asunto de tal naturaleza; si, lejos de constituir una intrusión en los asuntos propios del gabinete, estuviera únicamente vinculado con un papel cuya obtención la ley permite sólo a condición del pago de 10 centavos; si ello no supusiese intromisión alguna en materias sobre las cuales se considera al Ejecutivo como no sujeto a control alguno; ¿qué habría en la alta condición del funcionario que impidiera a un ciudadano reclamar sus derechos ante un tribunal de justicia, o que prohibiera a éste atender el reclamo, o expedir una orden mandando el cumplimiento de una obligación no dependiente de los poderes discrecionales del Ejecutivo, sino de los actos particulares del Congreso y de los poderes discrecionales del Ejecutivo, sino de los actos particulares del Congreso y de los principios generales del derecho?.

Si uno de los titulares de los departamentos de Estado comete un acto ilegal amparándose en su cargo, dando lugar a un reclamo de un ciudadano afectado, no puede sostenerse que su cargo, por sí solo, lo exima de ser juzgado por el procedimiento ordinario y obligado a obedecer el juicio de la ley.

¿Cómo podría entonces su cargo exceptuarlo de la aplicación de este modo particular de decidir acerca de la legalidad de su conducta si el caso no reviste diferencia alguna con cualquier otro en el cual un individuo común sería procesado?.

No es por el cargo que tenga la persona sino por la naturaleza de aquello que se le ordene hacer que se juzgará la pertinencia del mandamiento. Cuando un ministro actúa en un caso en que se ejercen los poderes discrecionales del Ejecutivo y donde el funcionario actúa como mero órgano de la voluntad del presidente, correspondería rechazar sin la menor duda todo pedido a la Corte para que ejerza un control de tal conducta a cualquier respecto. Pero cuando la conducta del funcionario es encomendada por la ley -de modo tal que su cumplimiento o incumplimiento afecte los derechos absolutos de los individuos- la cual no se encuentra bajo la dirección del presidente y no puede presumirse que éste la haya prohibido, como por ejemplo, registrar un nombramiento o un título de propiedad que ha cumplido todas las formalidades de la ley, o entregar una copia de tales registros; en esos casos, no se advierte sobre qué bases los tribunales de la Nación podrán estar menos obligados a dictar sentencia que si se tratara de funciones atribuidas a otro individuo que no fuese ministro.

Este, por lo tanto, es un claro caso en el que corresponde emitir un mandamiento, sea de entrega de la designación o de una copia de la misma extraída de los registros correspondientes, quedando entonces, por resolver, una sola cuestión: ¿puede la Corte emitir ese mandamiento?.

La ley por la que se establecen los tribunales judiciales en los EEUU autoriza a la Corte Suprema a emitir mandamientos, en casos en que fuesen comprendidos según los principios y las costumbres del derecho, a cualquier tribunal o persona designado en su oficio bajo la autoridad de los EEUU.

Siendo el secretario de Estado un funcionario bajo la autoridad del gobierno de los EEUU., se encuentra precisamente comprendido en las previsiones de la ley precitada; y si esta Corte no está autorizada a emitir una orden de ejecución a tal funcionario, sólo puede ser a causa de la inconstitucionalidad de la ley, incapaz por ello, de conferir la autoridad y de asignar las obligaciones que sus palabras parecen conferir y asignar. La Constitución deposita la totalidad del Poder Judicial de los EEUU. en una Corte Suprema y en tantos tribunales inferiores como en Congreso establezca en el transcurso del tiempo. Este poder se extiende expresamente al conocimiento de todas las causas que versen sobre puntos regidos por las leyes de los EEUU. y, consecuentemente, de algún modo puede extenderse al presente caso ya que el derecho invocado deriva de una ley de los EEUU. Al distribuir este poder la Constitución dice: «En todos los casos concernientes a embajadores, ministros y cónsules extranjeros, y en los que alguna provincia fuese parte, la Corte Suprema ejercerá jurisdicción originaria. En todos los casos mencionados anteriormente, la Corte ejercerá su jurisdicción por apelación».

Se ha sostenido ante el Tribunal que, como otorgamiento constitucional de jurisdicción a la Corte Suprema y a los tribunales ordinarios es general, y la cláusula que asigna las causas de jurisdicción originaria a la Corte Suprema no contiene expresiones negativas o restrictivas, el Poder Legislativo mantiene la facultad de atribuir competencia originaria a la Corte en otros casos que los precedentemente indicados, tomando en cuenta que tales casos pertenecen al Poder Judicial de los Estados Unidos.

Si se hubiera querido dejar librado a la discreción del Poder Legislativo la posibilidad de distribuir el Poder Judicial entre la Corte Suprema y los tribunales inferiores, habría sido ciertamente inútil hacer otra cosa que definir el ámbito de competencia del Poder Judicial en general, mencionando los tribunales a los que corresponde ejercerlo. Si ésta es la interpretación correcta, el resto de la norma constitucional carece de sentido.

Si el Congreso tiene la libertad de asignar a esta Corte competencia por apelación en los casos en los que la Constitución le asigna competencia originaria y fijarle competencia originaria en los casos en que le corresponde ejercerla por apelación, la distribución hecha en la Constitución es la forma carente de contenido.

Las palabras afirmativas son, a menudo en su operatividad, negatorias de otros objetos que los prescriptos, y en este caso debe asignárseles ese sentido so pena de privarlas de sentido absoluto. No puede presumirse que cláusula alguna de la Constitución este pensada para no tener efecto, por lo tanto, la interpretación contraria es inadmisible salvo que el texto expreso de la Constitución así lo manifieste. Cuando un instrumento legal organiza las bases fundamentales de un sistema judicial dividiéndolo en una Corte Suprema y en tantas inferiores como el Congreso decida, enumerando sus poderes y distribuyéndolos mediante la delimitación de los casos en los que la Corte Suprema ejercerá jurisdicción originaria y aquellos en que la ejercerá por vía de apelación, el sentido evidente de las palabras parece ser que en una clase de casos la competencia será originaria y no en los demás. Si cualquier otra interpretación convirtiera en inoperante dicha cláusula, tendríamos allí una razón adicional para rechazarla y para adherir al sentido obvio de las palabras. Luego, para que esta Corte esté en condiciones de emitir una orden de ejecución como la que se pide, debe demostrarse que se trata de un caso de competencia por apelación.

Se ha dicho en el Tribunal que la jurisdicción apelada puede ejercerse de diversos modos y que siendo la voluntad del Congreso que un mandamiento pueda ser emitido en el ejercicio de la jurisdicción apelada (ver ley de organización judicial de los EEUU de 1789), dicha voluntad debe ser obedecida. Esto es cierto, pero no obstante ello, la jurisdicción debe ser apelada y no originaria.

Es el criterio esencial de la jurisdicción por apelación, que ella abarca tópicos previamente determinados y no crea otros nuevos. Por ello, aunque es posible emitir un mandamiento a los tribunales inferiores, hacerlo respecto de un funcionario para que entregue un documento es lo mismo que intentar una acción originaria para la obtención de dicho documento y por ello, no parece pertenecer a la jurisdicción apelada sino a la originaria. Tampoco es necesario en este caso, capacitar a la Corte para que ejerza su competencia por vía de apelación. Por lo tanto, la autoridad otorgada a la Corte Suprema por la ley de organización judicial de los EEUU. para emitir órdenes directas de ejecución de conductas a funcionarios públicos, no parece estar respaldada en la Constitución, y hasta se hace necesario preguntarse si una competencia así conferida pueda ser ejercida.

La pregunta acerca de si una ley contraria a la Constitución puede convertirse en ley vigente del país es profundamente interesante para los EEUU. pero, felizmente, no tan complicada como interesante. Para decidir esta cuestión parece necesario tan sólo reconocer ciertos principios que se suponen establecidos como resultado de una prolongada y serena elaboración. Todas las instituciones fundamentales del país se basan en la creencia de que el pueblo tiene el derecho preexistente de establecer para su gobierno futuro los principios que juzgue más adecuados a su propia felicidad. El ejercicio de ese derecho supone un gran esfuerzo, que no puede ni debe ser repetido con mucha frecuencia. Los principios así establecidos son considerados fundamentales. Y desde que la autoridad de la cual proceden es suprema, y puede raramente manifestarse, están destinados a ser permanentes. Esta voluntad originaria y suprema organiza el gobierno y asigna a los diversos poderes sus funciones específicas. Puede hacer sólo esto, o bien fijar, además, límites que no podrán ser transpuestos por tales poderes.

El gobierno de los EEUU. es de esta última clase. Los poderes de la legislatura están definidos y limitados. Y para que estos límites no se confundan u olviden, la Constitución es escrita. ¿Con qué objeto son limitados los poderes y a qué efectos se establece que tal limitación sea escrita si ella puede, en cualquier momento, ser dejada de lado por los mismos que resultan sujetos pasivos de la limitación?.

Si tales límites no restringen a quienes están alcanzados por ellos y no hay diferencia entre actos prohibidos y actos permitidos, la distinción entre gobierno limitado y gobierno ilimitado queda abolida.

Hay sólo 2 alternativas demasiado claras para ser discutidas: o la Constitución controla cualquier ley contraria a aquélla, o la Legislatura puede alterar la Constitución mediante una ley ordinaria. Entre tales alternativas no hay términos medios: o la Constitución es la ley suprema, inalterable por medios ordinarios; o se encuentra al mismo nivel que las leyes y de tal modo, como cualquiera de ellas, puede reformarse o dejarse sin efecto siempre que al Congreso le plazca. Si es cierta la primera alternativa, entonces una ley contraria a la Constitución no es ley; si en cambio es verdadera la segunda, entonces las constituciones escritas son absurdos intentos del pueblo para limitar un poder ilimitable por naturaleza.

Ciertamente, todos aquellos que han elaborado constituciones escritas las consideran la ley fundamental y suprema de la Nación, y consecuentemente, la teoría de cualquier gobierno de ese tipo debe ser que una ley repugnante a la Constitución es nula. Esta teoría está íntimamente ligada al tipo de Constitución escrita y debe, por ello, ser considerada por esta Corte como uno de los principios básicos de nuestra sociedad. Por ello esta circunstancia no debe perderse de vista en el tratamiento ulterior de la materia.

Si una ley contraria a la Constitución es nula, ¿obliga a los tribunales a aplicarla no obstante su invalidez?. O bien, en otras palabras, no siendo ley, ¿constituye una norma operativa como lo sería una ley válida? Ello anularía en la práctica lo que se estableció en la teoría y constituiría, a primera vista, un absurdo demasiado grueso para insistir en él. Sin embargo la cuestión merece recibir un atento tratamiento.

Sin lugar a dudas, la competencia y la obligación del Poder Judicial es decidir qué es ley. Los que aplican las normas a casos particulares deben por necesidad exponer e interpretar esa norma. Si 2 leyes entran en conflicto entre sí el tribunal debe decidir acerca de la validez y aplicabilidad de cada una. Del mismo modo cuando una ley está en conflicto con la Constitución y ambas son aplicables a un caso, de modo que la Corte debe decidirlo conforme a la ley desechando la Constitución, o conforme a la Constitución desechando la ley, la Corte debe determinar cuál de las normas en conflicto gobierna el caso. Esto constituye la esencia misma del deber de administrar justicia. Luego, si los tribunales deben tener en cuenta la Constitución y ella es superior a cualquier ley ordinaria, es la Constitución y no la ley la que debe regir el caso al cual ambas normas se refieren.

Quienes niegan el principio de que la Corte debe considerar la Constitución como la ley suprema, se ven reducidos a la necesidad de sostener que los tribunales deben cerrar los ojos a la Constitución y mirar sólo a la ley. Esta doctrina subvertiría los fundamentos mismos de toda constitución escrita. Equivaldría a declarar que una ley totalmente nula conforme a los principios y teorías de nuestro gobierno es, en la práctica, completamente obligatoria. Significaría sostener que si el Gobierno actúa de un modo que le está expresamente prohibido la ley así sancionada sería, no obstante tal prohibición, eficaz. Estaría confiriendo práctica y realmente al Congreso una omnipotencia total con el mismo aliento con el cual profesa la restricción de sus poderes dentro de límites estrechos. Equivaldría a establecer al mismo tiempo los límites y el poder de transgredirlos a discreción.

Reducir de esta manera a la nada lo que hacemos considerado el más grande de los logros en materia de instituciones políticas -una constitución escrita- sería por sí mismo suficiente en América, donde las constituciones escritas han sido vistas con tanta reverencia, para rechazar la tesis. Pero las manifestaciones particulares que contiene la Constitución de los EEUU. construyen un andamiaje de argumentos adicionales en favor del rechazo de esta interpretación.

El Poder Judicial de los EEUU. entiende en todos los casos que versen sobre puntos regidos por la Constitución.

¿Pudo, acaso, haber sido la intención de quienes concedieron este poder, afirmar que al usar la Constitución, no debería atenderse a su contenido? ¿Que un caso regido por la Constitución debiera decidirse sin examinar el instrumento que lo rige?.

Esto es demasiado extravagante para se sostenido.

En ciertos casos, la Constitución debe ser interpretada y analizado su contenido por parte de los jueces.

Y si de este modo los jueces pueden abrir y examinar la totalidad de la Constitución ¿qué parte de ella les está prohibido leer u obedecer?.

Hay muchas otras partes de la Constitución que ilustran esta materia. Dice la Constitución que: ‘ningún impuesto o carga se impondrá sobre artículos exportados desde cualquiera de los estados’. Supongamos una carga impuesta sobre la exportación de algodón, o de tabaco o harina, y supongamos que se promueve una acción judicial destinada a exigir la devolución de lo pagado en virtud de dicha carga.

¿Debe darse un pronunciamiento judicial en tal caso?. ¿Deben los jueces cerrar los ojos a la Constitución y ver sólo la ley?.

La Constitución prescribe que: ‘No se sancionarán leyes conteniendo condenas penales individualizadas ni leyes retroactivas’.

Si, no obstante, tales leyes son sancionadas y una persona es procesada bajo tales leyes ¿debe la Corte condenar a muerte a esas víctimas a quienes la Constitución manda proteger?.

Dice la Constitución: ‘Ninguna persona será procesada por traición salvo mediante el testimonio de 2 testigos sobre el mismo acto o mediante su confesión pública ante un tribunal de justicia’.

En este caso, el lenguaje de la Constitución está especialmente dirigido a los tribunales. Les prescribe directamente una regla de prueba de la que no pueden apartarse.

Si la Legislatura modificara esa norma y permitiera la declaración de un solo testigo o la confesión fuera de un tribunal de justicia como requisitos suficientes de prueba, ¿debería la norma constitucional ceder frente a esa ley?.

Mediante estos y muchos otros artículos que podrá seleccionarse es claro que los constituyentes elaboraron ese instrumento como una regla obligatoria tanto para los tribunales como para la Legislatura.

¿Por qué motivo, si no, prescribe a los jueces jurar su cumplimiento? Este juramento apela, ciertamente, a su conducta en el desempeño de su cargo de carácter oficial.

!Qué inmoralidad sería imponérselos, si ellos (los jueces) fueran a ser usados como instrumentos -y como instrumentos conscientes- de la violación de lo que juran respetar!

El juramento del cargo judicial impuesto por el Congreso, es también completamente ilustrativo de la opinión legislativa sobre esta cuestión.

Este juramento dice: ‘juro solemnemente que administraré justicia sin importar las personas y haré justicia igualmente al pobre como al rico; y que desempeñaré leal e imparcialmente todas las obligaciones atinentes a mi cargo como..., de acuerdo a mis mejores capacidades y comprensión, conforme con la Constitución y las leyes de los EEUU.’.

¿Por qué motivo jura un juez desempeñar sus deberes de acuerdo con la Constitución de los EEUU., si esa Constitución no fuera una norma obligatoria para su gobierno? ¿Si estuviere cerrada sobre él y no pudiera ser inspeccionada por él?.

Si fuera ese el estado real de las cosas, constituiría algo peor que una solemne burla.

Pero además de ello, imponer, tanto como jurar en esos términos sería una hipocresía.

No es tampoco inútil observar que, al declarar cual será la ley suprema del país, la Constitución en sí misma es mencionada en primer lugar, y no todas las leyes de los EEUU. tienen esa calidad, sino sólo aquellas que se hagan de conformidad con la Constitución.

De tal modo, la terminología especial de la Constitución de los EEUU. confirma y enfatiza el principio, que se supone esencial para toda constitución escrita, de que la ley repugnante a la Constitución es nula, y que los tribunales, así como los demás poderes, están obligados por ese instrumento.

Por ello, se rechaza la petición del demandante. Cúmplase".

Versión en Inglés
MARBURY v. MADISON, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)

5 U.S. 137 (Cranch)

WILLIAM MARBURY

v.

JAMES MADISON, Secretary of State of the United States.

February Term, 1803

`

AT the December term 1801, William Marbury, Dennis Ramsay, Robert Townsend Hooe, and William Harper, by their counsel severally moved the court for a rule to James Madison, secretary of state of the United States, to show cause why a mandamus should not issue commanding him to cause to be delivered to them respectively their several commissions as justices of the peace in the district of Columbia.

This motion was supported by affidavits of the following facts: that notice of this motion had been given to Mr. Madison; that Mr. Adams, the late president of the United States, nominated the applicants to the senate for their advice and consent to be appointed justices of the peace of the district of Columbia; that the senate advised and consented to the appointments; that commissions in due form were signed by the said president appointing them justices, &c. and that the seal of the United States was in due form affixed to the said commissions by the secretary of state; that the applicants have requested Mr. Madison to deliver them their said commissions, who has not complied with that request; and that their said commissions are withheld from them; that the applicants have made application to Mr. Madison as secretary of state of the United States at his office, for information whether the commissions were signed and sealed as aforesaid; that explicit and satisfactory information has not been given in answer to that inquiry, either by the secretary of state, or any officer in the department of state; that application has been made to the secretary of the senate for a certificate of the nomination of the applicants, and of the advice and consent of the senate, who has declined giving such a certificate; whereupon a rule was made to show cause on the fourth day of this term. This rule having been duly served-- Mr. Jacob Wagner and Mr. Daniel Brent, who had been summoned to attend the court, and were required to give evidence, objected to be sworn, alleging that they were clerks in the department of state, and not bound to disclose any facts relating to the business or transactions of the office.

The court ordered the witnesses to be sworn, and their answers taken in writing; but informed them that when the questions were asked they might state their objections to answering each particular question, if they had any.

Mr. Lincoln, who had been the acting secretary of state, when the circumstances stated in the affidavits occurred, was called upon to give testimony. He objected to answering. The questions were put in writing.

The court said there was nothing confidential required to be disclosed. If there had been, he was not obliged to answer it, and if he thought any thing was communicated to him confidentially he was not bound to disclose, nor was he obliged to state any thing which would criminate himself.

The questions argued by the counsel for the relators were, 1. Whether the supreme court can award the writ of mandamus in any case. 2. Whether it will lie to a secretary of state, in any case whatever. 3. Whether in the present case the court may award a mandamus to James Madison, secretary of state.

Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the court.

At the last term, on the affidavits then read and filed with the clerk, a rule was granted in this case, requiring the secretary of state to show cause why a mandamus should not issue, directing him to deliver to William Marbury his commission as a justice of the peace for the county of Washington, in the district of Columbia.

No cause has been shown, and the present motion is for a mandamus. The peculiar delicacy of this case, the novelty of some of its circumstances, and the real difficulty attending the points which occur in it, require a complete exposition of the principles on which the opinion to be given by the court is founded.

These principles have been, on the side of the applicant, very ably argued at the bar. In rendering the opinion of the court, there will be some departure in form, though not in substance, from the points stated in that argument.

In the order in which the court has viewed this subject, the following questions have been considered and decided.

1. Has the applicant a right to the commission he demands?

2. If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of his country afford him a remedy?

3. If they do afford him a remedy, is it a mandamus issuing from this court?

The first object of inquiry is,

1. Has the applicant a right to the commission he demands?

His right originates in an act of congress passed in February 1801, concerning the district of Columbia.

After dividing the district into two counties, the eleventh section of this law enacts, 'that there shall be appointed in and for each of the said counties, such number of discreet persons to be justices of the peace as the president of the United States shall, from time to time, think expedient, to continue in office for five years. It appears from the affidavits, that in compliance with this law, a commission for William Marbury as a justice of peace for the county of Washington was signed by John Adams, then president of the United States; after which the seal of the United States was affixed to it; but the commission has never reached the person for whom it was made out.

In order to determine whether he is entitled to this commission, it becomes necessary to inquire whether he has been appointed to the office. For if he has been appointed, the law continues him in office for five years, and he is entitled to the possession of those evidences of office, which, being completed, became his property.

The second section of the second article of the constitution declares, 'the president shall nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not otherwise provided for.'

The third section declares, that 'he shall commission all the officers of the United States.'

An act of congress directs the secretary of state to keep the seal of the United States, 'to make out and record, and affix the said seal to all civil commissions to officers of the United States to be appointed by the president, by and with the consent of the senate, or by the president alone; provided that the said seal shall not be affixed to any commission before the same shall have been signed by the president of the United States.'

These are the clauses of the constitution and laws of the United States, which affect this part of the case. They seem to contemplate three distinct operations:

1. The nomination. This is the sole act of the president, and is completely voluntary.

2. The appointment. This is also the act of the president, and is also a voluntary act, though it can only be performed by and with the advice and consent of the senate.

3. The commission. To grant a commission to a person appointed, might perhaps be deemed a duty enjoined by the constitution. 'He shall,' says that instrument, 'commission all the officers of the United States.'

The acts of appointing to office, and commissioning the person appointed, can scarcely be considered as one and the same; since the power to perform them is given in two separate and distinct sections of the constitution. The distinction between the appointment and the commission will be rendered more apparent by adverting to that provision in the second section of the second article of the constitution, which authorises congress 'to vest by law the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper, in the president alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments;' thus contemplating cases where the law may direct the president to commission an officer appointed by the courts or by the heads of departments. In such a case, to issue a commission would be apparently a duty distinct from the appointment, the performance of which perhaps, could not legally be refused.

Although that clause of the constitution which requires the president to commission all the officers of the United States, may never have been applied to officers appointed otherwise than by himself, yet it would be difficult to deny the legislative power to apply it to such cases. Of consequence the constitutional distinction between the appointment to an office and the commission of an officer who has been appointed, remains the same as if in practice the president had commissioned officers appointed by an authority other than his own.

It follows too, from the existence of this distinction, that, if an appointment was to be evidenced by any public act other than the commission, the performance of such public act would create the officer; and if he was not removable at the will of the president, would either give him a right to his commission, or enable him to perform the duties without it.

These observations are premised solely for the purpose of rendering more intelligible those which apply more directly to the particular case under consideration. This is an appointment made by the president, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, and is evidenced by no act but the commission itself. In such a case therefore the commission and the appointment seem inseparable; it being almost impossible to show an appointment otherwise than by proving the existence of a commission: still the commission is not necessarily the appointment; though conclusive evidence of it.

But at what stage does it amount to this conclusive evidence?

The answer to this question seems an obvious one. The appointment being the sole act of the president, must be completely evidenced, when it is shown that he has done every thing to be performed by him.

Should the commission, instead of being evidence of an appointment, even be considered as constituting the appointment itself; still it would be made when the last act to be done by the president was performed, or, at furthest, when the commission was complete.

The last act to be done by the president, is the signature of the commission. He has then acted on the advice and consent of the senate to his own nomination. The time for deliberation has then passed. He has decided. His judgment, on the advice and consent of the senate concurring with his nomination, has been made, and the officer is appointed. This appointment is evidenced by an open, unequivocal act; and being the last act required from the person making it, necessarily excludes the idea of its being, so far as it respects the appointment, an inchoate and incomplete transaction.

Some point of time must be taken when the power of the executive over an officer, not removable at his will, must cease. That point of time must be when the constitutional power of appointment has been exercised. And this power has been exercised when the last act, required from the person possessing the power, has been performed. This last act is the signature of the commission. This idea seems to have prevailed with the legislature, when the act passed converting the department of foreign affairs into the department of state. By that act it is enacted, that the secretary of state shall keep the seal of the United States, 'and shall make out and record, and shall affix the said seal to all civil commissions to officers of the United States, to be appointed by the president:' 'provided that the said seal shall not be affixed to any commission, before the same shall have been signed by the president of the United States; nor to any other instrument or act, without the special warrant of the president therefor.'

The signature is a warrant for affixing the great seal to the commission; and the great seal is only to be affixed to an instrument which is complete. It attests, by an act supposed to be of public notoriety, the verity of the presidential signature.

It is never to be affixed till the commission is signed, because the signature, which gives force and effect to the commission, is conclusive evidence that the appointment is made.

The commission being signed, the subsequent duty of the secretary of state is prescribed by law, and not to be guided by the will of the president. He is to affix the seal of the United States to the commission, and is to record it.

This is not a proceeding which may be varied, if the judgment of the executive shall suggest one more eligible, but is a precise course accurately marked out by law, and is to be strictly pursued. It is the duty of the secretary of state to conform to the law, and in this he is an officer of the United States, bound to obey the laws. He acts, in this respect, as has been very properly stated at the bar, under the authority of law, and not by the instructions of the president. It is a ministerial act which the law enjoins on a particular officer for a particular purpose.

If it should be supposed, that the solemnity of affixing the seal, is necessary not only to the validity of the commission, but even to the completion of an appointment, still when the seal is affixed the appointment is made, and the commission is valid. No other solemnity is required by law; no other act is to be performed on the part of government. All that the executive can do to invest the person with his office, is done; and unless the appointment be then made, the executive cannot make one without the co- operation of others.

After searching anxiously for the principles on which a contrary opinion may be supported, none have been found which appear of sufficient force to maintain the opposite doctrine.

Such as the imagination of the court could suggest, have been very deliberately examined, and after allowing them all the weight which it appears possible to give them, they do not shake the opinion which has been formed.

In considering this question, it has been conjectured that the commission may have been assimilated to a deed, to the validity of which, delivery is essential.

This idea is founded on the supposition that the commission is not merely evidence of an appointment, but is itself the actual appointment; a supposition by no means unquestionable. But for the purpose of examining this objection fairly, let it be conceded, that the principle, claimed for its support, is established.

The appointment being, under the constitution, to be made by the president personally, the delivery of the deed of appointment, if necessary to its completion, must be made by the president also. It is not necessary that the livery should be made personally to the grantee of the office: it never is so made. The law would seem to contemplate that it should be made to the secretary of state, since it directs the secretary to affix the seal to the commission after it shall have been signed by the president. If then the act of livery be necessary to give validity to the commission, it has been delivered when executed and given to the secretary for the purpose of being sealed, recorded, and transmitted to the party.

But in all cases of letters patent, certain solemnities are required by law, which solemnities are the evidences of the validity of the instrument. A formal delivery to the person is not among them. In cases of commissions, the sign manual of the president, and the seal of the United States, are those solemnities. This objection therefore does not touch the case.

It has also occurred as possible, and barely possible, that the transmission of the commission, and the acceptance thereof, might be deemed necessary to complete the right of the plaintiff.

The transmission of the commission is a practice directed by convenience, but not by law. It cannot therefore be necessary to constitute the appointment which must precede it, and which is the mere act of the president. If the executive required that every person appointed to an office, should himself take means to procure his commission, the appointment would not be the less valid on that account. The appointment is the sole act of the president; the transmission of the commission is the sole act of the officer to whom that duty is assigned, and may be accelerated or retarded by circumstances which can have no influence on the appointment. A commission is transmitted to a person already appointed; not to a person to be appointed or not, as the letter enclosing the commission should happen to get into the post-office and reach him in safety, or to miscarry.

It may have some tendency to elucidate this point, to inquire, whether the possession of the original commission be indispensably necessary to authorize a person, appointed to any office, to perform the duties of that office. If it was necessary, then a loss of the commission would lose the office. Not only negligence, but accident or fraud, fire or theft, might deprive an individual of his office. In such a case, I presume it could not be doubted, but that a copy from the record of the office of the secretary of state, would be, to every intent and purpose, equal to the original. The act of congress has expressly made it so. To give that copy validity, it would not be necessary to prove that the original had been transmitted and afterwards lost. The copy would be complete evidence that the original had existed, and that the appointment had been made, but not that the original had been transmitted. If indeed it should appear that the original had been mislaid in the office of state, that circumstance would not affect the operation of the copy. When all the requisites have been performed which authorize a recording officer to record any instrument whatever, and the order for that purpose has been given, the instrument is in law considered as recorded, although the manual labour of inserting it in a book kept for that purpose may not have been performed.

In the case of commissions, the law orders the secretary of state to record them. When therefore they are signed and sealed, the order for their being recorded is given; and whether inserted in the book or not, they are in law recorded.

A copy of this record is declared equal to the original, and the fees to be paid by a person requiring a copy are ascertained by law. Can a keeper of a public record erase therefrom a commission which has been recorded? Or can he refuse a copy thereof to a person demanding it on the terms prescribed by law?

Such a copy would, equally with the original, authorize the justice of peace to proceed in the performance of his duty, because it would, equally with the original, attest his appointment.

If the transmission of a commission be not considered as necessary to give validity to an appointment; still less is its acceptance. The appointment is the sole act of the president; the acceptance is the sole act of the officer, and is, in plain common sense, posterior to the appointment. As he may resign, so may he refuse to accept: but neither the one nor the other is capable of rendering the appointment a nonentity.

That this is the understanding of the government, is apparent from the whole tenor of its conduct.

A commission bears date, and the salary of the officer commences from his appointment; not from the transmission or acceptance of his commission. When a person, appointed to any office, refuses to accept that office, the successor is nominated in the place of the person who has declined to accept, and not in the place of the person who had been previously in office and had created the original vacancy.

It is therefore decidedly the opinion of the court, that when a commission has been signed by the president, the appointment is made; and that the commission is complete when the seal of the United States has been affixed to it by the secretary of state.

Where an officer is removable at the will of the executive, the circumstance which completes his appointment is of no concern; because the act is at any time revocable; and the commission may be arrested, if still in the office. But when the officer is not removable at the will of the executive, the appointment is not revocable and cannot be annulled. It has conferred legal rights which cannot be resumed.

The discretion of the executive is to be exercised until the appointment has been made. But having once made the appointment, his power over the office is terminated in all cases, where by law the officer is not removable by him. The right to the office is then in the person appointed, and he has the absolute, unconditional power of accepting or rejecting it.

Mr. Marbury, then, since his commission was signed by the president and sealed by the secretary of state, was appointed; and as the law creating the office gave the officer a right to hold for five years independent of the executive, the appointment was not revocable; but vested in the officer legal rights which are protected by the laws of his country.

To withhold the commission, therefore, is an act deemed by the court not warranted by law, but violative of a vested legal right.

This brings us to the second inquiry; which is,

2. If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of his country afford him a remedy? The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection. In Great Britain the king himself is sued in the respectful form of a petition, and he never fails to comply with the judgment of his court.

In the third volume of his Commentaries, page 23, Blackstone states two cases in which a remedy is afforded by mere operation of law.

'In all other cases,' he says, 'it is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law whenever that right is invaded.'

And afterwards, page 109 of the same volume, he says, 'I am next to consider such injuries as are cognizable by the courts of common law. And herein I shall for the present only remark, that all possible injuries whatsoever, that did not fall within the exclusive cognizance of either the ecclesiastical, military, or maritime tribunals, are, for that very reason, within the cognizance of the common law courts of justice; for it is a settled and invariable principle in the laws of England, that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress.'

The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.

If this obloquy is to be cast on the jurisprudence of our country, it must arise from the peculiar character of the case.

It behoves us then to inquire whether there be in its composition any ingredient which shall exempt from legal investigation, or exclude the injured party from legal redress. In pursuing this inquiry the first question which presents itself, is, whether this can be arranged with that class of cases which come under the description of damnum absque injuria-a loss without an injury.

This description of cases never has been considered, and it is believed never can be considered as comprehending offices of trust, of honour or of profit. The office of justice of peace in the district of Columbia is such an office; it is therefore worthy of the attention and guardianship of the laws. It has received that attention and guardianship. It has been created by special act of congress, and has been secured, so far as the laws can give security to the person appointed to fill it, for five years. It is not then on account of the worthlessness of the thing pursued, that the injured party can be alleged to be without remedy.

Is it in the nature of the transaction? Is the act of delivering or withholding a commission to be considered as a mere political act belonging to the executive department alone, for the performance of which entire confidence is placed by our constitution in the supreme executive; and for any misconduct respecting which, the injured individual has no remedy.

That there may be such cases is not to be questioned; but that every act of duty to be performed in any of the great departments of government constitutes such a case, is not to be admitted.

By the act concerning invalids, passed in June 1794, the secretary at war is ordered to place on the pension list all persons whose names are contained in a report previously made by him to congress. If he should refuse to do so, would the wounded veteran be without remedy? Is it to be contended that where the law in precise terms directs the performance of an act in which an individual is interested, the law is incapable of securing obedience to its mandate? Is it on account of the character of the person against whom the complaint is made? Is it to be contended that the heads of departments are not amenable to the laws of their country?

Whatever the practice on particular occasions may be, the theory of this principle will certainly never be maintained. No act of the legislature confers so extraordinary a privilege, nor can it derive countenance from the doctrines of the common law. After stating that personal injury from the king to a subject is presumed to be impossible, Blackstone, Vol. III. p. 255, says, 'but injuries to the rights of property can scarcely be committed by the crown without the intervention of its officers: for whom, the law, in matters of right, entertains no respect or delicacy; but furnishes various methods of detecting the errors and misconduct of those agents by whom the king has been deceived and induced to do a temporary injustice.'

By the act passed in 1796, authorizing the sale of the lands above the mouth of Kentucky river, the purchaser, on paying his purchase money, becomes completely entitled to the property purchased; and on producing to the secretary of state the receipt of the treasurer upon a certificate required by the law, the president of the United States is authorized to grant him a patent. It is further enacted that all patents shall be countersigned by the secretary of state, and recorded in his office. If the secretary of state should choose to withhold this patent; or the patent being lost, should refuse a copy of it; can it be imagined that the law furnishes to the injured person no remedy?

It is not believed that any person whatever would attempt to maintain such a proposition.

It follows then that the question, whether the legality of an act of the head of a department be examinable in a court of justice or not, must always depend on the nature of that act.

If some acts be examinable, and others not, there must be some rule of law to guide the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction.

In some instances there may be difficulty in applying the rule to particular cases; but there cannot, it is believed, be much difficulty in laying down the rule.

By the constitution of the United States, the president is invested with certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political character, and to his own conscience. To aid him in the performance of these duties, he is authorized to appoint certain officers, who act by his authority and in conformity with his orders.

In such cases, their acts are his acts; and whatever opinion may be entertained of the manner in which executive discretion may be used, still there exists, and can exist, no power to control that discretion. The subjects are political. They respect the nation, not individual rights, and being entrusted to the executive, the decision of the executive is conclusive. The application of this remark will be perceived by adverting to the act of congress for establishing the department of foreign affairs. This officer, as his duties were prescribed by that act, is to conform precisely to the will of the president. He is the mere organ by whom that will is communicated. The acts of such an officer, as an officer, can never be examinable by the courts.

But when the legislature proceeds to impose on that officer other duties; when he is directed peremptorily to perform certain acts; when the rights of individuals are dependent on the performance of those acts; he is so far the officer of the law; is amenable to the laws for his conduct; and cannot at his discretion sport away the vested rights of others.

The conclusion from this reasoning is, that where the heads of departments are the political or confidential agents of the executive, merely to execute the will of the president, or rather to act in cases in which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only politically examinable. But where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.

If this be the rule, let us inquire how it applies to the case under the consideration of the court. The power of nominating to the senate, and the power of appointing the person nominated, are political powers, to be exercised by the president according to his own discretion. When he has made an appointment, he has exercised his whole power, and his discretion has been completely applied to the case. If, by law, the officer be removable at the will of the president, then a new appointment may be immediately made, and the rights of the officer are terminated. But as a fact which has existed cannot be made never to have existed, the appointment cannot be annihilated; and consequently if the officer is by law not removable at the will of the president, the rights he has acquired are protected by the law, and are not resumable by the president. They cannot be extinguished by executive authority, and he has the privilege of asserting them in like manner as if they had been derived from any other source.

The question whether a right has vested or not, is, in its nature, judicial, and must be tried by the judicial authority, If, for example, Mr. Marbury had taken the oaths of a magistrate, and proceeded to act as one; in consequence of which a suit had been instituted against him, in which his defence had depended on his being a magistrate; the validity of his appointment must have been determined by judicial authority.

So, if he conceives that by virtue of his appointment he has a legal right either to the commission which has been made out for him or to a copy of that commission, it is equally a question examinable in a court, and the decision of the court upon it must depend on the opinion entertained of his appointment.

That question has been discussed, and the opinion is, that the latest point of time which can be taken as that at which the appointment was complete, and evidenced, was when, after the signature of the president, the seal of the United States was affixed to the commission.

It is then the opinion of the court,

1. That by signing the commission of Mr. Marbury, the president of the United States appointed him a justice of peace for the county of Washington in the district of Columbia; and that the seal of the United States, affixed thereto by the secretary of state, is conclusive testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment; and that the appointment conferred on him a legal right to the office for the space of five years.

2. That, having this legal title to the office, he has a consequent right to the commission; a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that right, for which the laws of his country afford him a remedy.

It remains to be inquired whether,

3. He is entitled to the remedy for which he applies. This depends on,

1. The nature of the writ applied for. And,

2. The power of this court.

1. The nature of the writ.

Blackstone, in the third volume of his Commentaries, page 110, defines a mandamus to be, 'a command issuing in the king's name from the court of king's bench, and directed to any person, corporation, or inferior court of judicature within the king's dominions, requiring them to do some particular thing therein specified which appertains to their office and duty, and which the court of king's bench has previously determined, or at least supposes, to be consonant to right and justice.'

Lord Mansfield, in 3 Burrows, 1266, in the case of The King v. Baker et al. states with much precision and explicitness the cases in which this writ may be used.

'Whenever,' says that very able judge, 'there is a right to execute an office, perform a service, or exercise a franchise (more especially if it be in a matter of public concern or attended with profit), and a person is kept out of possession, or dispossessed of such right, and has no other specific legal remedy, this court ought to assist by mandamus, upon reasons of justice, as the writ expresses, and upon reasons of public policy, to preserve peace, order and good government.' In the same case he says, 'this writ ought to be used upon all occasions where the law has established no specific remedy, and where in justice and good government there ought to be one.'

In addition to the authorities now particularly cited, many others were relied on at the bar, which show how far the practice has conformed to the general doctrines that have been just quoted.

This writ, if awarded, would be directed to an officer of government, and its mandate to him would be, to use the words of Blackstone, 'to do a particular thing therein specified, which appertains to his office and duty, and which the court has previously determined or at least supposes to be consonant to right and justice.' Or, in the words of Lord Mansfield, the applicant, in this case, has a right to execute an office of public concern, and is kept out of possession of that right.

These circumstances certainly concur in this case.

Still, to render the mandamus a proper remedy, the officer to whom it is to be directed, must be one to whom, on legal principles, such writ may be directed; and the person applying for it must be without any other specific and legal remedy.

1. With respect to the officer to whom it would be directed. The intimate political relation, subsisting between the president of the United States and the heads of departments, necessarily renders any legal investigation of the acts of one of those high officers peculiarly irksome, as well as delicate; and excites some hesitation with respect to the propriety of entering into such investigation. Impressions are often received without much reflection or examination; and it is not wonderful that in such a case as this, the assertion, by an individual, of his legal claims in a court of justice, to which claims it is the duty of that court to attend, should at first view be considered by some, as an attempt to intrude into the cabinet, and to intermeddle with the prerogatives of the executive.

It is scarcely necessary for the court to disclaim all pretensions to such a jurisdiction. An extravagance, so absurd and excessive, could not have been entertained for a moment. The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion. Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.

But, if this be not such a question; if so far from being an intrusion into the secrets of the cabinet, it respects a paper, which, according to law, is upon record, and to a copy of which the law gives a right, on the payment of ten cents; if it be no intermeddling with a subject, over which the executive can be considered as having exercised any control; what is there in the exalted station of the officer, which shall bar a citizen from asserting, in a court of justice, his legal rights, or shall forbid a court to listen to the claim; or to issue a mandamus, directing the performance of a duty, not depending on executive discretion, but on particular acts of congress and the general principles of law?

If one of the heads of departments commits any illegal act, under colour of his office, by which an individual sustains an injury, it cannot be pretended that his office alone exempts him from being sued in the ordinary mode of proceeding, and being compelled to obey the judgment of the law. How then can his office exempt him from this particular mode of deciding on the legality of his conduct, if the case be such a case as would, were any other individual the party complained of, authorize the process?

It is not by the office of the person to whom the writ is directed, but the nature of the thing to be done, that the propriety or impropriety of issuing a mandamus is to be determined. Where the head of a department acts in a case in which executive discretion is to be exercised; in which he is the mere organ of executive will; it is again repeated, that any application to a court to control, in any respect, his conduct, would be rejected without hesitation.

But where he is directed by law to do a certain act affecting the absolute rights of individuals, in the performance of which he is not placed under the particular direction of the president, and the performance of which the president cannot lawfully forbid, and therefore is never presumed to have forbidden; as for example, to record a commission, or a patent for land, which has received all the legal solemnities; or to give a copy of such record; in such cases, it is not perceived on what ground the courts of the country are further excused from the duty of giving judgment, that right to be done to an injured individual, than if the same services were to be performed by a person not the head of a department.

This opinion seems not now for the first time to be taken up in this country.

It must be well recollected that in 1792 an act passed, directing the secretary at war to place on the pension list such disabled officers and soldiers as should be reported to him by the circuit courts, which act, so far as the duty was imposed on the courts, was deemed unconstitutional; but some of the judges, thinking that the law might be executed by them in the character of commissioners, proceeded to act and to report in that character.

This law being deemed unconstitutional at the circuits, was repealed, and a different system was established; but the question whether those persons, who had been reported by the judges, as commissioners, were entitled, in consequence of that report, to be placed on the pension list, was a legal question, properly determinable in the courts, although the act of placing such persons on the list was to be performed by the head of a department.

That this question might be properly settled, congress passed an act in February 1793, making it the duty of the secretary of war, in conjunction with the attorney general, to take such measures as might be necessary to obtain an adjudication of the supreme court of the United States on the validity of any such rights, claimed under the act aforesaid.

After the passage of this act, a mandamus was moved for, to be directed to the secretary at war, commanding him to place on the pension list a person stating himself to be on the report of the judges.

There is, therefore, much reason to believe, that this mode of trying the legal right of the complainant, was deemed by the head of a department, and by the highest law officer of the United States, the most proper which could be selected for the purpose.

When the subject was brought before the court the decision was, not, that a mandamus would not lie to the head of a department, directing him to perform an act, enjoined by law, in the performance of which an individual had a vested interest; but that a mandamus ought not to issue in that case-the decision necessarily to be made if the report of the commissioners did not confer on the applicant a legal right.

The judgment in that case is understood to have decided the merits of all claims of that description; and the persons, on the report of the commissioners, found it necessary to pursue the mode prescribed by the law subsequent to that which had been deemed unconstitutional, in order to place themselves on the pension list.

The doctrine, therefore, now advanced is by no means a novel one.

It is true that the mandamus, now moved for, is not for the performance of an act expressly enjoined by statute.

It is to deliver a commission; on which subjects the acts of congress are silent. This difference is not considered as affecting the case. It has already been stated that the applicant has, to that commission, a vested legal right, of which the executive cannot deprive him. He has been appointed to an office, from which he is not removable at the will of the executive; and being so appointed, he has a right to the commission which the secretary has received from the president for his use. The act of congress does not indeed order the secretary of state to send it to him, but it is placed in his hands for the person entitled to it; and cannot be more lawfully withheld by him, than by another person.

It was at first doubted whether the action of detinue was not a specific legal remedy for the commission which has been withheld from Mr. Marbury; in which case a mandamus would be improper. But this doubt has yielded to the consideration that the judgment in detinue is for the thing itself, or its value. The value of a public office not to be sold, is incapable of being ascertained; and the applicant has a right to the office itself, or to nothing. He will obtain the office by obtaining the commission, or a copy of it from the record.

This, then, is a plain case of a mandamus, either to deliver the commission, or a copy of it from the record; and it only remains to be inquired,

Whether it can issue from this court.

The act to establish the judicial courts of the United States authorizes the supreme court 'to issue writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.'

The secretary of state, being a person, holding an office under the authority of the United States, is precisely within the letter of the description; and if this court is not authorized to issue a writ of mandamus to such an officer, it must be because the law is unconstitutional, and therefore absolutely incapable of conferring the authority, and assigning the duties which its words purport to confer and assign.

The constitution vests the whole judicial power of the United States in one supreme court, and such inferior courts as congress shall, from time to time, ordain and establish. This power is expressly extended to all cases arising under the laws of the United States; and consequently, in some form, may be exercised over the present case; because the right claimed is given by a law of the United States.

In the distribution of this power it is declared that 'the supreme court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction.'

It has been insisted at the bar, that as the original grant of jurisdiction to the supreme and inferior courts is general, and the clause, assigning original jurisdiction to the supreme court, contains no negative or restrictive words; the power remains to the legislature to assign original jurisdiction to that court in other cases than those specified in the article which has been recited; provided those cases belong to the judicial power of the United States.

If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the legislature to apportion the judicial power between the supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that body, it would certainly have been useless to have proceeded further than to have defined the judicial power, and the tribunals in which it should be vested. The subsequent part of the section is mere surplusage, is entirely without meaning, if such is to be the construction. If congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction, where the constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original; and original jurisdiction where the constitution has declared it shall be appellate; the distribution of jurisdiction made in the constitution, is form without substance.

Affirmative words are often, in their operation, negative of other objects than those affirmed; and in this case, a negative or exclusive sense must be given to them or they have no operation at all.

It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect; and therefore such construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it. If the solicitude of the convention, respecting our peace with foreign powers, induced a provision that the supreme court should take original jurisdiction in cases which might be supposed to affect them; yet the clause would have proceeded no further than to provide for such cases, if no further restriction on the powers of congress had been intended. That they should have appellate jurisdiction in all other cases, with such exceptions as congress might make, is no restriction; unless the words be deemed exclusive of original jurisdiction.

When an instrument organizing fundamentally a judicial system, divides it into one supreme, and so many inferior courts as the legislature may ordain and establish; then enumerates its powers, and proceeds so far to distribute them, as to define the jurisdiction of the supreme court by declaring the cases in which it shall take original jurisdiction, and that in others it shall take appellate jurisdiction, the plain import of the words seems to be, that in one class of cases its jurisdiction is original, and not appellate; in the other it is appellate, and not original. If any other construction would render the clause inoperative, that is an additional reason for rejecting such other construction, and for adhering to the obvious meaning.

To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.

It has been stated at the bar that the appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in a variety of forms, and that if it be the will of the legislature that a mandamus should be used for that purpose, that will must be obeyed. This is true; yet the jurisdiction must be appellate, not original.

It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction, that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper, is in effect the same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and therefore seems not to belong to appellate, but to original jurisdiction. Neither is it necessary in such a case as this, to enable the court to exercise its appellate jurisdiction.

The authority, therefore, given to the supreme court, by the act establishing the judicial courts of the United States, to issue writs of mandamus to public officers, appears not to be warranted by the constitution; and it becomes necessary to inquire whether a jurisdiction, so conferred, can be exercised.

The question, whether an act, repugnant to the constitution, can become the law of the land, is a question deeply interesting to the United States; but, happily, not of an intricacy proportioned to its interest. It seems only necessary to recognise certain principles, supposed to have been long and well established, to decide it.

That the people have an original right to establish, for their future government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis on which the whole American fabric has been erected. The exercise of this original right is a very great exertion; nor can it nor ought it to be frequently repeated. The principles, therefore, so established are deemed fundamental. And as the authority, from which they proceed, is supreme, and can seldom act, they are designed to be permanent.

This original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns to different departments their respective powers. It may either stop here; or establish certain limits not to be transcended by those departments.

The government of the United States is of the latter description. The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the constitution is written. To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing; if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained? The distinction between a government with limited and unlimited powers is abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed are of equal obligation. It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter the constitution by an ordinary act.

Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.

If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the constitution is not law: if the latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power in its own nature illimitable.

Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution is void.

This theory is essentially attached to a written constitution, and is consequently to be considered by this court as one of the fundamental principles of our society. It is not therefore to be lost sight of in the further consideration of this subject.

If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts and oblige them to give it effect? Or, in other words, though it be not law, does it constitute a rule as operative as if it was a law? This would be to overthrow in fact what was established in theory; and would seem, at first view, an absurdity too gross to be insisted on. It shall, however, receive a more attentive consideration.

It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each. So if a law be in opposition to the constitution: if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law: the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.

If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and he constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.

Those then who controvert the principle that the constitution is to be considered, in court, as a paramount law, are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the constitution, and see only the law.

This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions. It would declare that an act, which, according to the principles and theory of our government, is entirely void, is yet, in practice, completely obligatory. It would declare, that if the legislature shall do what is expressly forbidden, such act, notwithstanding the express prohibition, is in reality effectual. It would be giving to the legislature a practical and real omnipotence with the same breath which professes to restrict their powers within narrow limits. It is prescribing limits, and declaring that those limits may be passed at pleasure.

That it thus reduces to nothing what we have deemed the greatest improvement on political institutions-a written constitution, would of itself be sufficient, in America where written constitutions have been viewed with so much reverence, for rejecting the construction. But the peculiar expressions of the constitution of the United States furnish additional arguments in favour of its rejection.

The judicial power of the United States is extended to all cases arising under the constitution. Could it be the intention of those who gave this power, to say that, in using it, the constitution should not be looked into? That a case arising under the constitution should be decided without examining the instrument under which it arises?

This is too extravagant to be maintained.

In some cases then, the constitution must be looked into by the judges. And if they can open it at all, what part of it are they forbidden to read, or to obey?

There are many other parts of the constitution which serve to illustrate this subject.

It is declared that 'no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state.' Suppose a duty on the export of cotton, of tobacco, or of flour; and a suit instituted to recover it. Ought judgment to be rendered in such a case? ought the judges to close their eyes on the constitution, and only see the law.

The constitution declares that 'no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.'

If, however, such a bill should be passed and a person should be prosecuted under it, must the court condemn to death those victims whom the constitution endeavours to preserve?

'No person,' says the constitution, 'shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.'

Here the language of the constitution is addressed especially to the courts. It prescribes, directly for them, a rule of evidence not to be departed from. If the legislature should change that rule, and declare one witness, or a confession out of court, sufficient for conviction, must the constitutional principle yield to the legislative act?

From these and many other selections which might be made, it is apparent, that the framers of the constitution contemplated that instrument as a rule for the government of courts, as well as of the legislature.

Why otherwise does it direct the judges to take an oath to support it? This oath certainly applies, in an especial manner, to their conduct in their official character. How immoral to impose it on them, if they were to be used as the instruments, and the knowing instruments, for violating what they swear to support!

The oath of office, too, imposed by the legislature, is completely demonstrative of the legislative opinion on this subject. It is in these words: 'I do solemnly swear that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich; and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge all the duties incumbent on me as according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the constitution and laws of the United States.'

Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeably to the constitution of the United States, if that constitution forms no rule for his government? if it is closed upon him and cannot be inspected by him.

If such be the real state of things, this is worse than solemn mockery. To prescribe, or to take this oath, becomes equally a crime.

It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank.

Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void, and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.

The rule must be discharged.